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Abstract—Various methodologies exist for assessing the risk of
cascading outage in power systems, differing in the cascading
mechanisms considered and in the way they are modeled. These
methodologies can be classified in three groups: static com-
putation (QSS methodologies), dynamic computation (dynamic
methodologies), or a combination of both (hybrid methodologies).
The objective of this paper is to benchmark the performance of
several widely used QSS cascading outage methodologies. For
that purpose, they are applied on a unique system, the RTS-
96, and the results are compared. Several metrics and indicators
are used for that comparison: expected demand loss, distribution
of demand loss, distribution of lines outaged and critical lines.
Results show common trends but also discrepancies between
methodologies. It implies that there is not yet a standardized
way to analyze the risk of cascading outage in power systems,
and that the specific tool used by a power system engineer can
impact the recommendations.
Index Terms—Cascading outage, Blackout, Power system se-
curity, Power system reliability, Risk analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Various methodologies exist for assessing the risk of cas-
cading outage in power systems. These methodologies differ in
the cascading mechanisms considered and in their modelling.
The use of a specific methodology for the planning and the
operation of a power system is relevant only if the results of
that methodology can be trusted, i.e. only if they approximate
reality with some degree of fidelity. There are mainly two ways
to analyze the performances of a specific methodology: to
compare it to other methodologies, i.e. to benchmark it, and to
compare it to real measured or historical data, i.e. to validate it.
The objective of this paper is to benchmark the performance
of several widely used Quasi-Steady-State (QSS) cascading
outage methodologies.
Benchmarking and validation of cascading failure analysis
tools are extensively discussed in [1]. In particular, that paper
proposed a general definition of benchmarking: “Benchmark-
ing is a process for measuring the performance of a tool, such
as a software program or a business process, using a trusted
procedure and/or dataset, in a way that allows one to compare
the performance of one tool to another.” In this paper, the
concept of benchmarking of cascading outage methodologies
is implemented as the process of comparing the results of one
cascading outage methodology to another using a standardized
dataset. It is important to stress that such a benchmarking
Work prepared by the IEEE Working Group on Understanding, Predic-
tion, Mitigation and Restoration of Cascading Failures
leads only to relative comparisons between methodologies and
cannot lead to conclusions about the relevance (or the absolute
performance) of a specific methodology. That is, we cannot
give a definitive validation since there is no historical data
for the chosen test system. However, we can give a sample
of historical data to display the general form of real-world
results that can help guide the art and science of cascading
simulations as they progress.
In order to benchmark several widely used QSS cascading
outage methodologies, this paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents the common features and the differences
of the benchmarked methodologies. Section III introduces a
set of indicators to benchmark the methodologies. Section IV
presents the results derived from the application of the method-
ologies to a common test system. Section V discusses the
practical implications of the benchmarking exercise. Finally,
section VI concludes.
II. METHODOLOGIES
The methodologies for cascading outage analysis can be
classified according to the computation of the electrical vari-
ables after each cascading event: static computation (QSS
methodologies), dynamic computation (dynamic methodolo-
gies), or a combination of both (hybrid methodologies). This
paper focuses on QSS cascading outage methodologies. There
are many of them, each one having its own specificity.
Nevertheless, the methodologies follow a common canvas and
the specific features can be classified according to several
dimensions.
As shown in Figure 1, the typical canvas can be summarized
as follows. The system is initialized at the pre-contingency
state, and one or several initial contingencies are triggered,
i.e. the initiating event(s). Then, the post-contingency state is
computed. If one or several elements are enduring unaccept-
able working conditions (e.g. flow or voltage violations), they
can be disconnected. If one or several elements are discon-
nected, the process of the post-contingency state computation
is repeated, until no new significant violation/disconnection
occurs. Final consequences are recorded and the analysis is
repeated for other conditions.
Specific features of each methodologies within this typical
canvas are portrayed as several dimensions. A first dimension
differentiating approaches is the scope of the analysis in terms
of the analyzed pre-contingency states. Most methodologies
aim at estimating the risk of cascading outage for a specific
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Fig. 1. Typical canvas of QSS cascading outage methodologies
operating state, but some methodologies aim at estimating
the risk of cascading outage for an extended time frame, i.e.
one year, by assuming an overarching operating strategy. A
methodology aiming at estimating the risk of cascading outage
for a specific state can be used also to estimate the risk within
a time frame by performing the analysis for all conditions that
could arise during that time frame. Furthermore, methodolo-
gies aiming at estimating the risk of cascading outage for an
overall year can be used to estimate the risk for a specific
state, by enforcing the consideration of that state only.
A second dimension is the degree of stochasticity, for both
the initiating events and the subsequent events. When a purely
deterministic approach is used for the selection of the initiating
events, their likelihood is not considered by the methodology,
and the N k events with a same k are considered comparable.
On the contrary, when a probabilistic approach is used for
the initiating events, their likelihood (i.e., frequency or prob-
ability of occurrence) is explicitly considered. Note however
than a probability can be nevertheless associated a posteriori
to initiating events for deterministic approaches in a post-
processing phase. When a purely deterministic approach is
used for the cascading events, cascading outages are simulated
only on the basis of thresholds, i.e. an element is disconnected
if a corresponding threshold is violated. In that case, one
particular initiating event leads to a unique cascading scenario
for a specific operating state. Conversely, when a probabilistic
approach is used for initiating events, cascading events are
not triggered automatically upon a violation of an electrical
variable (e.g., load on a line, voltage at a bus), but they have a
probability to appear that depends on the value of the electrical
variable exceeding the safety margins.
A third dimension is the population of the contingency list.
These may be listed according to systematic enumeration, i.e.
the list of initiating events is build systematically to include
N   k events, or to Monte Carlo simulation, i.e., the list of
initiating events is sampled. Some methods include a reduction
step of the number of contingencies so that only those likely
to be most critical are tested in the cascading phase.
A fourth dimension is the Power Flow (PF) model used.
The representation of the transmission system can be based
on the full version of power flow equations (i.e., AC PF), or
on the linearized version (i.e., DC PF). The computation of
the steady state following a topology change can be based
on a direct solution of the power flow equations, or on an
optimal power flow (OPF), which capture the deployment of
manual control actions. In case of a load/generation imbalance
following a system split or the loss of a generating unit, a
simplified model of the primary frequency control is used to
simulate the restoration of the load/generation balance. Some
models include corrective actions implementing automatic (i.e.
automatic defense schemes) or manual load shedding, which
are activated in case of lack of power flow convergence.
Conversely, other models assume a global voltage instability
in case of lack of power flow convergence. A fifth dimension
is spanned by the cascading mechanisms. Cascading due to
overloaded branches (e.g., overloaded lines) is a mechanism
considered by all methodologies. The tripping of overloaded
elements can represent a “thermal failure” (e.g., tree flashover
for an overhead line), or the activation of a protection sys-
tems (e.g., overcurrent protections). The incorrect operation
of protection systems such as hidden failures is not modeled
systematically by QSS methodologies, but is considered in
several of them. When the AC power flow equations are
used, the disconnection of loads and/or generators in case
of unacceptable voltage conditions are also implemented as
a cascading mechanism in some of the tools. Uncertainty
in the protections settings can be also represented. Finally,
although QSS methodologies do not consider the full dynamics
of power systems, several dynamic cascading phenomena (e.g.,
frequency instability, transient instability, voltage instability)
are represented in a simplified way or by heuristics in some
methodologies.
Table I classifies the QSS cascading outage methodolo-
gies benchmarked in this paper according to the different
dimensions. Commercial methodologies usually have a limited
degree of explicit stochasticity, while research-grade method-
ologies tend to represent uncertainties more explicitly (i.e.,
probabilistic approaches for both the initiating and the cas-
cading events).
The discrepancies between methodologies lead to differ-
ent requirements on the data needed to estimate the risk
of cascading outages. The OPA methodology requires data
on the transmission system (i.e., impedances of transmission
elements), data on load (peak load and load duration curve)
and data on generating units (maximum output power, unit
costs). However, it does not require power flow data of a
specific operating state like other methodologies do. The OPA
methodology calculates a long-term risk accounting for a slow
system upgrade, whereas the other methodologies calculate
the risk of a fixed power system. The load duration curve
and the unit costs are not needed when the risk of cascading
outage is analyzed for a specific operating state. The degree of
stochasticity embedded in the method strongly influences the
need of probabilistic data. Purely deterministic methodologies
do not need probabilistic data. In probabilistic methods, the
likelihood of initiating events is estimated via reliability data
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION OF QSS CASCADING OUTAGE METHODOLOGIES
Name Ref. Type Consideration ofinitiating events
Selection of the
ulterior events
Contingency
list Operating state PF model
Cascading
mechanisms
Manchester [2] R&D Probabilistic Probabilistic Monte Carlo Specific state needed AC OL,HF,FI
OPA [3]–[5] R&D Probabilistic Probabilistic Monte Carlo Generic model used AC/DC OL,EG
Practice [6] R&D Probabilistic Probabilistic Enumeration Specific state needed AC OL,HF,VV,FI
PCM [7]–[9] c  Deterministic Deterministic Enumeration Specific state needed AC OL,VV,VI
TRANSMISSION 2000 [10] c  Probabilistic Deterministic Enumeration Specific state needed AC OL,VV
PSS/E [11] c  Probabilistic Deterministic Enumeration Specific state needed AC OL,VI
TransCare [12] c  Deterministic Deterministic Enumeration Specific state needed AC OL,VV,VI
c =Commercial, OL=Line Overloads, HF=Hidden Failures, VV=Voltage Violations, VI=Voltage Instability, FI=Frequency Instability, EG=Evolving Grid
of components, i.e., failure rates and sometimes also repair
rates. The computation of the likelihood of multiple initiating
events can differ from one methodology to another (e.g., PSS/E
and Manchester model employ different equations). Moreover,
the simulation of outages during the cascading phase entails
a need to define the conditions under which an element is
disconnected. These conditions can be based on deterministic
thresholds (e.g., an overloaded line is disconnected as soon
as its current exceeds a specific threshold) or probability
distributions (e.g., an overloaded line has a probability to be
disconnected, and that probability depends on the overload).
III. METRICS AND INDICATORS FOR BENCHMARKING
It is not practical to compare individual cascades simulated
by different simulations with different modeling assumptions,
because slight differences can lead to different cascading
outcomes (this is also the case in the real power system).
What can be compared in the simulated cascades is the overall
form of distributions of quantities. Every simulation produces
many samples of cascades and the distribution of quantities
over these samples can be easily obtained. This distribution
corresponds to a probability distribution of the quantity in
probabilistic simulations and the frequency distribution of
the quantity in deterministic simulations. As described in
the previous section, the cascade samples arise from running
the simulation with suitable sampling from the initial power
system state (if the analysis is not performed for a unique
state), the initiating contingencies, or the following events (i.e.,
progression of the cascade).
For analysis purposes, cascades that only have an initial
outage and then no further outages, or short cascades that
do not shed load are included in the analysis. These small
cascades are useful possible precursors to blackouts, have a
successful outcome, and need to be included in the analysis
to give a fair account of the power system performance.
The load shed is one important measure of the impact
of a cascading outage on society. The expected load shed
could thus be an important metric to benchmark the method-
ologies. However, the actual economic impact is not purely
proportional to the load shed, i.e. the Value of Lost Load
is not constant. The economic impact depends in particular
on the duration of the power outage and the frequencies of
the outages. Also, the expected load shed is not sufficiently
informative and must be augmented by the distribution of load
shed, i.e. the frequencies of the various sizes of blackouts,
given that a blackout occurred. The cascade size can also
be measured by the number of lines outaged. This does not
directly measure any societal consequence, but it includes the
cascades that do not shed load, and these cascades can be
thought of as blackout precursors.
In several methodologies (but not all of them), cascades of
outages can be grouped into generations or tiers; in simulations
this often corresponds to fast actions or an outer loop of
calculations. Then in each cascade “parent” outages produce
“child” outages in the next generation, and the children may
become parents themselves to produce a further generation,
and so on. The average propagation is the average number of
children per parent and is calculated from the data simply by
dividing the total number of children in all the cascades by
the total number of parents. The average propagation quantifies
how much the cascades grow beyond the initial outages.
Because investment in cascading mitigation should be
driven by risk (probability ⇥ cost), we combine the expression
for EENS in terms of real power load shed in [13] with a rough
estimate of blackout cost of $1000 for 1 MWh to approximate
direct blackout costs in US dollars as C = 500(load shed)1.5 $
(this only approximates direct costs, and neglects reputational,
regulatory, and social costs).
One use for cascading simulations is to identify the lines
that are critical for cascading. There are several interesting
definitions of critical for cascading, including participating
often in the initiating outages, participating often in initiating
outages that lead to substantial cascading, or participating
often in cascading propagation. These definitions correspond
to the different mitigation objectives of minimizing all initial
outages, minimizing initial outages that lead to substantial
cascading, and minimizing the propagation of cascades after
they initiate. The way that cascades are generated affects the
interpretation of the critical lines. For example, instead of
being driven by a contingency list or samples of combinations
of lines out, some simulations and the historical data are driven
by weather events and other hazards, and this yields the critical
lines of the power system stressed by those hazards. We give
the definitions and results for several simulations to foster
comparison and discussion of these ranking methods.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Benchmarking system
The QSS methods are tested on the standard RTS-96 3-
area system model [14], shown in Figure 2. The RTS-96 3-
area system has 73 buses and 120 branches. The total load in
the system is 8550 MW. Compared to the initial model, each
reactor of 100 MVAr at buses 106, 206 and 306 is split in
two, 50 MVAr at each extremity of the cable. These reactors
are considered to be automatically disconnected in case of
the outage of the corresponding cable. The pre-contingency
steady-state is based on a Preventive-Security-Constrained
Optimal Power Flow, such that the system is N   1 secure1.
Fig. 2. RTS-96 3-area system.
B. Specific simulation parameters
The benchmark includes all methodologies presented in
Table I, and the OPA methodology is applied both using a
DC and an AC OPF. For the Manchester model, 1 billion
simulations and a hidden failure probability of 1% are used.
For both the AC and the DC OPA models, the initial failure
probability of each line is assumed to be 0.01, and a line
is disconnected when its power flow is larger than 99% of
its rating. The DC OPA model is run 1,000,000 times, while
the AC OPA model is run 30,000 times. In PRACTICE, the
following parameters are adopted to model the behavior of
protection systems: hidden failure probability of 1%, pick-up
current of all overcurrent relays (for both lines and trans-
formers) of 1.2 pu, standard deviation for the probability
distribution of the overcurrent protection relay of 0.02. For the
PCM model, Transmission 2000 and PSS/E, N  1 and N  2
contingencies are tested. The following assumptions are used
in the PCM model: lines and transformers are disconnected
when the power flow goes over 125% of their rating, and loads
and generators are disconnected when the voltage goes below
0.9 pu, or over 1.1 pu. For PSS/E, lines and transformers are
disconnected when the power flow goes over their emergency
rating. For TRANSMISSION 2000, the cascade analysis stops
when the demand loss reaches 500 MW. For TransCARE, the
following threshold values are used: lines and transformers are
disconnected when the power flow goes over 125% of their
rating, and loads and generators are disconnected when the
voltage goes below 0.9 pu.
C. Historical data
Although there is no historical data corresponding to the
RTS-96 system model, it is still useful to see examples of real
1Details: http://homepages.ulb.ac.be/⇠phenneau/CFWG Benchmark.html
forms of historical data to help guide the simulations towards
the ultimate goal of a validated reality. For distribution of load
shed, statistics are taken from the NERC data for the North
American WECC region [13]. For distribution of line outages,
statistics are taken from BPA data, processed into cascades and
generations with the methods of [15]. The average propagation
is 0.28.
D. Summary and discussion of results
As explained in section III, the quantities compared in the
benchmarking are the risk (in terms of expected demand loss),
the probability distribution of the demand loss, the distribution
of lines outaged in each cascade, the average propagation and
the top 10 critical facilities. The simulations vary in the way
they generate initial outages, so this information is also given
to aid comparison. For distributions, historical data are also
given. However, in comparing the results of the simulations
of RTS system with the historical data, it should be recalled
that the historical data is observed in one real system, and is
only included as a guide to what can happen in reality. Only
the general form of the historical data is informative in this
context.
Table II indicates the risk in terms of expected demand
loss. Only methodologies considering initiating events in a
probabilistic way can lead to an estimation of expected de-
mand loss. Although the order of magnitude of the expected
demand loss is the same for the different methodologies, there
are significant differences: a factor of 4 appears between PSS/E
and Practice. Note that initiating events considered in PSS/E
are limited to N-1 and N-2 contingencies, so it appears logical
to obtain an underestimation of the risk.
TABLE II
AVERAGE RISK
Methodology Expected demand loss(MW/year)
Manchester 189.4
DC OPA 130.7
Practice 250.5
PSS/E 79.8
To complement Table II, Figure 3 shows the distribution of
load shed in the form of the survival function of data from
all the methods. The survival function is equivalent to 1–
(cumulative distribution function) and shows the probability
that the demand loss is larger than a given value, given that
demand loss occurred in the system. For all methodologies,
the limit of this probability is thus 1 when the demand
loss approaches 0. The way in which the survival function
decreases as blackout size increases shows the decreasing
frequencies of blackouts as their size increases. Figure 3 is
a log-log plot so that the smaller probabilities of the larger
blackouts can be seen. Indeed, the historical blackout data in
Figure 3 declines roughly linearly on a log-log plot. This is
called a “heavy tail” and it implies that large blackouts are
rarer than smaller blackouts, but not so rare that their risk
is smaller. Indeed the historical data shows that the risk of
large blackouts exceeds the risk of medium size blackouts
[13]. Therefore any risk-based mitigation should aim to jointly
reduce the probability and impact of both large and small
blackouts, and it is the purpose of Figure 3 to allow the
predicted frequencies of all blackout sizes to be compared.
Up to approximately 1% of the total load, all methodologies
estimate similar survival functions. On the other hand, the
benchmarked methodologies lead to very different estimation
of the total blackout probability. The two extreme cases are
PSS/E and DC OPA. On one hand, PSS/E stops the analysis
in lack of power flow convergence and the post-processing
performed in this paper assumes then a complete blackout.
Because the system is initially in N   1 security, demand
loss appears only for N   2 contingencies. As several N   2
contingencies are assumed to lead to a complete blackout, the
conditional probability of having a complete blackout, given
that demand loss occurred in the system, is very high. On the
other hand, in the DC OPA methodology, the system does not
have voltage stability issue, and loads can always be supplied
by local generators. As several loads are connected to a bus
with a generator, the probability to have a complete blackout is
zero. While an assumption similar to that used for PSS/E might
have been made for the TRANSMISSION 2000 results, for
this methodology any results beyond a user defined load loss
are considered speculative and therefore results have not been
included. Nevertheless, the methodology provides ranking of
cascades by excluding sequences that are unlikely to result in
uncontrolled widespread cascading
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Fig. 3. Distribution of load shed
The distribution of the number of lines outaged in the
cascading data is shown as a survival function in Figure 4.
It shows the probability that the total number of lines outaged
is larger than a given value, given that at least one line
outage occurred in the system. For all methodologies, this
probability is thus 1 when the number of lines outaged is 1.
This is however not the case for the historical data, because
they are multiplied by the ratio of the number of lines in
the RTS by the number of lines in the BPA system. Again,
the log-log plot helps to show the frequency of the larger
cascades that are likely to be more consequential. Because
the Manchester model and PRACTICE are using the same
way to estimate the probability of N   2 contingencies, and
because the power system is initially N   1 secure (i.e. a
single contingency cannot entail a cascading outage), they lead
to the same probability to have at least 2 lines outaged. They
follow then similar patterns, showing a knee at 7 outaged lines
and two plateaus with different probability levels (10 5 and
10 7 respectively for Manchester and PRACTICE models). A
similar but smaller plateau can be observed in the AC OPA
results. Similarly to the distribution of load shed, the various
methodologies benchmarked exhibit quite different patterns.
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The historical data for load shed and number of lines
outaged shows linear behavior on the log-log plots, which
indicates a heavy tailed distribution. This form of behavior
is also shown in some range of values by some of the simu-
lations. The comparison is limited not only by the historical
data being collected from systems different than the RTS, but
also particularly by the larger size of these systems (WECC
for load shed and 614 lines for line outages). The small size
of the RTS could limit the cascading characteristics observed,
and future benchmarking with larger systems is indicated.
Tables III and IV compare the top 5 critical components in-
volved in initial outages, and the critical components involved
in subsequent outages, respectively. PSS/E has been left out
of the second table, because it does not provide details on
components tripped within each cascading outage simulation.
Although some lines appear critical for several methodologies
(e.g. line between buses 314 and 316), most of them are
identified as critical only by one or two methodologies.
V. DISCUSSION ON PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Both the planning and the operation of power systems can
be improved (e.g. by investments in transmission facilities
and modifications of the dispatch) based on an estimation
the risk of cascading outage. Although the assessment of the
risk of cascading outage is not yet a planning and operation
standard procedure all over the world, it is already required
by the NERC reliability standard TPL-001-4 “Transmission
System Planning Performance Requirements” as part of the
planning process in North America. Furthermore, pilot projects
to integrate such an assessment in planning and operation
processes are emerging in various regions.
TABLE III
RANK OF TOP 5 CRITICAL COMPONENTS INVOLVED IN INITIAL OUTAGES, FOR EACH METHODOLOGY
Line 107-108
307-
308
207-
208
308-
309
208-
209
303-
324
315-
324
206-
210
115-
121
319-
320
215-
221
120-
123
220-
223
316-
317
314-
316
306-
310
208-
210
308-
310
106-
110
116-
119
214-
216
115-
116
215-
216
312-
323
313-
323
213-
223
116-
117
Manchester 3 1 4 5 2
DC OPA 3 2 1 5 4
AC OPA 5 4 3 2 1
PRACTICE 5 4 3 1 2
PCM 2 4 1 3 5
Tr. 2000 1 2 3 4
PSS/E 4 3 2 1 4
Transcare 3 2 5 4 1
TABLE IV
RANK OF TOP 5 CRITICAL COMPONENTS INVOLVED IN SUBSEQUENT OUTAGES, FOR EACH METHODOLOGY
Line 207-208
307-
308
107-
108
308-
309
208-
209
115-
121
315-
321
303-
309
301-
303
101-
103
206-
210
106-
110
306-
310
107-
203
318-
223
314-
316
116-
117
215-
221
312-
323
313-
323
103-
109
Manchester 1 2 4 3 5
DC OPA 2 1 3 5 4
AC OPA 5 4 3 2 1
PRACTICE 5 3 4 2 1
PCM 4 3 2 1 5
For both planning and operation applications, an estimation
of the average risk is not sufficient: critical elements have to be
identified such that actions to address the weak points can be
taken. Results show that the estimation of the average risk is of
the same order of magnitude for the different methodologies,
but that a large variation can be observed in distributions and in
critical elements. It implies that the conclusions about planning
and operation actions to take strongly rely on the specific
cascading outage analysis methodology used. Moreover, there
is variation in how the critical elements are defined. This lack
of robustness can be a major barrier hampering the use of
assessment of the risk of cascading outage in planning and
operation processes. Additional R&D work is thus needed to
narrow down the range of results obtained from the different
QSS cascading outage methodologies, such that robust recom-
mendations can emerge from such analyses. The use of more
detailed models considering the power system dynamics might
be needed to achieve that goal.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Although various QSS cascading outage analysis method-
ologies exist, they have never been benchmarked on the same
test system with the same initial conditions. This is precisely
the purpose of this paper: to benchmark the performance of
several widely-used methodologies on the RTS-96. Results
show common trends but also discrepancies between method-
ologies. It implies that there is not yet a standardized way to
analyze the risk of cascading outage in power systems, and that
the specific tool used by a power system engineer can impact
the recommendations. The benchmarking is useful in focusing
the necessary discussion on detailed assumptions for model-
ing, sampling the cascading possibilities, setting parameters,
computing the risk, and selecting critical elements for upgrade.
Further R&D work is thus needed to align the methodologies.
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